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Abstract
Quantum entanglement is widely believed to be a feature of physical
reality with undoubted (though debated) metaphysical implications. But
Schrödinger introduced entanglement as a theoretical relation between
representatives of the quantum states of two systems. Entanglement rep-
resents a physical relation only if quantum states are elements of physical
reality. So arguments for metaphysical holism or nonseparability from en-
tanglement rest on a questionable view of quantum theory. Assignment of
entangled quantum states predicts experimentally conrmed violation of
Bell inequalities. Can one use these experimental results to argue directly
for metaphysical conclusions? No. Quantum theory itself gives us our
best explanation of violations of Bell inequalities, with no superluminal
causal inuences and no metaphysical holism or nonseparability but only
if quantum states are understood as objective and relational, though pre-
scriptive rather than ontic. Correct quantum state assignments are backed
by true physical magnitude claims: but backing is not grounding. Quan-
tum theory supports no general metaphysical holism or nonseparability;
though a claim about a compound physical system may be signicant and
true while similar claims about its components are neither. Entanglement
may well have have few, if any, rst-order metaphysical implications. But
the quantum theory of entanglement has much to teach the metaphysi-
cian about the roles of chance, causation, modality and explanation in the
epistemic and practical concerns of a physically situated agent.
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1 Introduction
Many philosophers believe that quantum entanglement has important meta-
physical implications. In this paper I explain why I disagree. My disagreement
rests on two claims. First, entanglement is not a physical relation between
physical systems but a feature of the way certain quantum states must be rep-
resented. Second, even though they are objective, these and other quantum
states are not novel physical objects, elds or magnitudes: nor do they repre-
sent physical relations or properties of objects to which they are assigned. Its
quicker to say systems are entangled than that their quantum states must be
mathematically represented in a certain way, but that is almost always what
physicists mean by entanglement. That is what Schrödinger meant when he in-
troduced the concept, as I explain in section 2. Section 3 is a brief introduction
to di¤erent conceptions of entanglement, so conceived.
It was Einstein who rst perceived metaphysical intimations of entan-
glement in what he took to be the "orthodox" view of quantum states. Section
4 explains where he discerned them, and why Einstein rejected this "orthodox"
view because of what he took to be its metaphysical implications. I also state
(but do not endorse) some metaphysical principles of holism and nonsepara-
bility I have explained elsewhere. Section 5 shows how, by taking quantum
state entanglement to imply a physical relation between physical systems, the
view Einstein called "orthodox" can be seen to imply metaphysical holism and
nonseparability. Section 6 considers whether other "unorthodox" views of the
quantum state have similar implications. Einstein suggested one view that does
not, but Bell and others have shown whats wrong with this view.
Schrödinger entertained the view that a quantum state represents not
a physical system but our knowledge of it a view that has at least as strong a
claim to be called orthodox. When purged of subjectivism while acknowledging
the importance of application, this becomes the view that a quantum state is
objective but relative to the physical situation of any hypothetical agent in a
position to assign it. In section 7 I sketch such a view I have advanced elsewhere,
emphasizing the role of a quantum state as authoritative source of reliable advice
on the signicance and credibility of certain claims about physical systems.
Section 8 shows how by adopting this view one can use the assignment of an
entangled state to explain patterns of correlation in violation of Bell inequalities
with no instantaneous action at a distance.
In section 9 I explain why in this view entangled quantum states require
no grounding, and why there is nothing nonseparable that requires or admits ex-
planation in terms of a metaphysical grounding relation. Section 10 shows what
one can learn about chance, causation and explanation from the application of
quantum theory to explain violations of Bell inequalities. I conclude by pointing
out that the advantages of understanding chance, causation, explanation and
quantum states in terms of the functions of these concepts in thinking about
and acting in the physical world support a more general pragmatism. This
seeks philosophical illumination by asking not what in the world corresponds to
these concepts, but what in the world would make these concepts useful in the
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epistemic and practical activities of physically situated, and so informationally
deprived, agents like us. In this light metaphysics is nowhere to be seen.
2 How it all Began
As is well known, Schrödinger introduced the concept he named entanglement
in the following passage:
When two systems, of which we know the states by their re-
spective representatives, enter into temporary physical interaction
due to known forces between them, and when after a time of mu-
tual inuence the systems separate again, then they can no longer
be described in the same way as before, viz. by endowing each of
them with a representative of its own. I would not call that one but
rather the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics, the one that
enforces its entire departure from classical lines of thought. By the
interaction the two representatives (or   functions) have become
entangled. ( [55], p. 555)
Writing in German later the same year he used the word Verschränkung.
Unlike the English word entanglement, this German word is used to express
clasping of hands, crossing of legs and folding of arms in each case an action
intimately connecting just two objects.1 Schrödinger [56] rst applied the word
Verschränkungto predictions and to knowledge, then to variables like position
and momentum, to measurements, and to the "expectation catalogs" provided
by quantum state assignments. In none of the ve parts of his two major 1935-6
publications on the interpretation of quantum mechanics did he apply either
entangledor verschränktdirectly to physical systems.
It is somewhat less well known that Schrödingers interest in entan-
glement was sparked by the famous EPR [16] paper and further enamed by
a fascinating correspondence with Einstein following its publication (see Fine
[18], chapters 3,5). Schrödinger rst used the word Verschränkungin print on
page 827 of the paper in which he presented his famous "cat paradox" [56].2 He
acknowledges the inuence of the EPR paper in the following footnote.
"The appearance of this work motivated the present - shall I say
lecture or general confession?" [op. cit., p. 845]
1By this word choice he unconsciously anticipated the monogamy of (maximal) entangle-
ment.
2 Interestingly he also used the word verheddert on the same page to describe the way
a systems  -function gets tangled up with that of an apparatus during a measurement. He
uses only Verschränkungand verschränktthroughout the rest of the paper.
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3 What is Entanglement?
For Schrödinger, entanglement presented a challenge to our understanding of
quantum theory.3 Today physicists regard it as a resource to be exploited in
technological applications of quantum information and communication. But
disputes continue on how to understand quantum theory, and (to echo the title
of an important recent article) there still remain some puzzles and unresolved
issues about quantum entanglement itself (see Earman [12]).
Schrödinger applied the concept only to pure quantum states of two pre-
viously interacting systems, or rather to their representations in non-relativistic
quantum mechanics by   functions in a Hilbert space of vector states j i.4 In
that context one can express the condition as follows
	ab 6=  a b (Vector Entanglement)
where 	ab represents a pure quantum state assigned to the composite system
ab, f a;  bg is any ordered pair of   functions from the Hilbert spaces of
vectors used to represent states assigned to systems a; b respectively, and the
multiplication of   functions on the right corresponds to their tensor product

 when considered as vectors in these spaces. Each of a; b is here assumed to
be a massive object either a particle or itself composed of particles so the
system ab is a massive composite object.
A hydrogen atom can serve as an example. If one takes a to be its elec-
tron and b its nuclear proton and treats the atom non-relativistically (ignoring
spin), then neither electron nor proton can be assigned a pure quantum state
even while the atom is assumed to be isolated and so assigned its lowest energy
state. This may seem surprising if one assumes that the   function
 (r) =
1p


1
a0
 3
2
exp ( r=a0) (1)
represents the quantum state of the electron (where a0 = ~2=me2 is the radius
of the rst "Bohr orbit"). But r here does not represent the electrons position
re but its position relative to the nucleus (r = re   rp), and m represents the
3Or even to its adequacy:
Indubitably the situation described here is, in present quantum mechanics,
a necessary and indispensable feature. The question arises, whether it is so in
Nature too. I am not satised about there being su¢ cient experimental evidence
for that. ([57], p. 451)
Entanglement is still a necessary and indubitable feature of quantum theory a feature that
has by now received exhaustive experimental conrmation.
4The concept is now regularly applied to states of two or more systems that have never
interacted, and even retrospectively to systems that no longer exist (e.g. in entanglement-
swapping scenarios, some of which include delayed choice). It has been generalized to apply to
other kinds of representations of states, also in relativistic quantum mechanics and quantum
eld theory.
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so-called reduced mass of the electron m = mempme+mp . The atomic wave function
is not entangled when expressed as the product
	(R; r) =  (r)'(R) (2)
in which '(R) is a pure state assigned to the atoms center of mass
R =
mprp +mere
mp +me
: (3)
This example illustrates several important points about entanglement. The
rst is that (Vector Entanglement) expresses entanglement as a relation between
representatives of quantum states, not between systems. The second is that
in order to use a mathematical relation like (Vector Entanglement) to infer a
relation between subsystems one must rst associate each representative with
a system by specifying of what mathematical structure that representative is
an element: The example shows that just saying what structure the composite
systems representative "lives in" may fail uniquely to determine its subsystems
or how their states might be represented.5
But isnt it obvious that the real subsystems of a hydrogen atom are its
electron and proton, not the center-of-mass subsystem and the reduced-mass-
electron subsystem? This raises the third important point about entanglement.
In order to promote a mathematical relation like (Vector Entanglement) to
a physical (or metaphysical) relation between physical systems, one must ap-
peal to some independent criterion of what makes a system physical. If one
restricts attention to the domain of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, that
may seem not so hard to come by: A system is physical only if it is com-
posed of particles atoms, electrons, protons and such. But contemporary gen-
eralizations of Schrödingers concept are now regularly applied outside of that
domain to massless photons, to other quanta of relativistic quantum eld the-
ories of the Standard Model, to open bounded regions of spacetime in so-called
local quantum physics, and more abstractly in the algebraic approach to quan-
tum physics where ontological questions are often dismissed or swept under the
rug.
If a; b are indistinguishable fermions, such as any two electrons, then
(Vector Entanglement) implies that their representatives are always entangled,
since their joint representative must change sign under exchange of the labels
a;b: j	abi =   j	bai. The requirement that the representative of any such
set of indistinguishable fermions be totally antisymmetric (i.e. change sign un-
der any single swap of labels) has been used to argue that all indistinguishable
fermions of the same type are always entangled, whether or not they have in-
teracted.
...there is a universal correlation of the EPR type which we do not
have to cleverly set up, it is simply the total antisymmetrization
5As the example shows, a Hilbert space generally has multiple inequivalent decompositions
as a tensor product of Hilbert spaces.
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of a many fermion state, which does correlate the electrons of my
body with those of any inhabitant of the Andromeda galaxy. (Levy-
Leblond [43])
But this is best seen as challenging the adequacy of (Vector Entanglement)
as a criterion for a pair of indistinguishable fermions to be entangled.
A more important reason to formulate a better criterion is provided by
Gisins theorem [24]. This is usually stated as follows: All non-product (pure)
states of two systems violate a Bell inequality (specically, a CHSH [9] inequal-
ity.) At rst sight this theorem provides a strong reason supporting adoption
of (Vector Entanglement) as necessary and su¢ cient for entanglement of two
pure vector state representatives, because violation of a Bell inequality is a clear
sign of non-classical behavior. But suppose one were to prepare two unexcited
atoms of lithium-6, one in a laboratory in Leiden with z-spin up, the other
in a laboratory in Rio with z-spin down, so their translational states are e¤ec-
tively representable by non-overlapping   functions or orthogonal state vectors
jLi ; jRi. Lithium-6 is an uncommon isotope of this element. An unexcited atom
of Li-6 has spin 1. Because the atoms are indistinguishable fermions, their total
state must be antisymmetrized as follows
1p
2
(jLia j"ia jRib j#ib   jRia j#ia jLib j"ib) : (4)
This is not a product state, so Gisins theorem apparently implies that it
must violate a CHSH inequality. In fact it does not, since the Indistinguisha-
bility Postulate ensures that the only observables on the total system are those
that commute with operators inducing permutation of state spaces (here cor-
responding to the labels a; b): a measurement of z-spin-component in Leiden
is not representable by an operator in either the a or the b space but by the
operator S^az 
 1^b+ 1^a 
 S^bz on the total ab space. To "prove" Gisins theo-
rem for indistinguishable particles one would need to appeal to the existence of
observables ruled out by the Indistinguishability Postulate.
Several authors6 have proposed a revised criterion for Indistinguishable
Fermion Entanglement (IFE) that may be expressed as follows:
The states of systems of indistinguishable fermions Sa and Sb
composing system Sab = Sa + Sb assigned state j	abi are entangled
if and only if j	abi canot be obtained by antisymmetrizing a product
j ai 
 j bi :
A simple revision of Gisins proof now shows that all states of two identical
fermions that satisfy this criterion of entanglement violate a CHSH inequality.
Here is one such state that may be assigned to a pair of unexcited atoms of
lithium-6 with opposite z-spins, one in a laboratory in Leiden, the other in a
laboratory in Rio
1p
2
(j"ia j#ib + j#ia j"ib)
 (jLia jRib   jRia jLib) : (5)
6 [22], [21], [42], [8].
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With very high probability, statistics collected in suitable experiments on lithium
atoms assigned state (5) would violate a CHSH inequality, while statistics col-
lected in an experiment on atoms assigned state (4) would never violate that
inequality.
Philosophers have often used the following vector representing the spin
state of two spin- 12 particles to illustrate entanglement
1p
2
(j"ia j#ib   j#ia j"ib) : (6)
This EPR-Bohm state may be assigned to a pair of hydrogen atoms formed
by dissociation of a hydrogen molecule. In this situation each atom acts as a
boson but (6) is antisymmetrized, despite the fact that the state assigned to a
system of indistinguishable bosons must be symmetrized it must remain the
same under exchange of labels like a; b. But (6) does not represent the total
state of the pair of hydrogen atoms. Assigning the following symmetrized state
respects the bosonic character of the hydrogen atoms in a pair, one in Leiden,
the other in Rio
1p
2
(j"ia j#ib   j#ia j"ib)
 (jLia jRib   jRia jLib) : (7)
Much more could be said about how to dene entanglement of states
of two or more systems in various forms of quantum theory that use di¤erent
mathematical objects to represent quantum states of di¤erent types of system
(see [12]). But it is time to ask what kind of gold metaphysicians have sought
to extract from the mathematical ore of quantum entanglement.
4 Metaphysical Prospects
It was not a philosopher but a physicist who rst perceived the metaphysical in-
timations of quantum entanglement but rejected them! Bohr and Schrödinger
each saw measurement as uniting object and apparatus into a kind of indivisible
whole, though in di¤erent ways. Einstein introduced a principle of separation
and argued that it was incompatible with the orthodox view of quantum theory.
But the holism that Schrödinger located in quantum entanglement was
not metaphysical but epistemological. Writing in English, this is how he rst
expressed it in 1935:
...the best possible knowledge of a whole does not necessarily include
the best possible knowledge of all its parts, even though they may
be entirely separated and therefore virtually capable of being "best
possibly known", i.e. of possessing, each of them, a representative
of its own. ([55], p. 555)
He further elaborates in his "cat paper"
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Let us pause for a moment. This result in its abstractness actu-
ally says it all: Best possible knowledge of a whole does not neces-
sarily include the same for its parts. .... The whole is in a denite
state, the parts taken individually are not.
"How so? Surely a system must be in some sort of state." "No.
State is   function, is maximal sum of knowledge. I didnt nec-
essarily provide myself with this, I may have been lazy. Then the
system is in no state."
"Fine, but then too the agnostic prohibition of questions is not
yet in force and in our case I can tell myself: the subsystem is already
in some state, I just dont know which."
"Wait. Unfortunately no. There is no I just dont know. For
as to the total system, maximal knowledge is at hand..."
The insu¢ ciency of the   function as model replacement rests
solely on the fact that one doesnt always have it. If one does have
it, then by all means let it serve as description of the state. But
sometimes one does not have it, in cases where one might reasonably
expect to. And in that case, one dare not postulate that it "is
actually a particular one, one just doesnt know it"; the above-chosen
standpoint forbids this. "It" is namely a sum of knowledge; and
knowledge, that no one knows, is none.
([56], p. 827: this English translation by J.D. Trimmer, reprinted in
[61], p. 161. Italics in original.)
By the above chosen standpointSchrödinger here refers to the view that a
representative (  function) of a quantum state represents a catalog of expecta-
tions concerning possible future measurement outcomes. The italicized sentence
explicitly rejects the view that a   function models an element of physical re-
ality in the way that a function on 3n-dimensional conguration space (or 6n-
dimensional phase space) could be taken to model the behavior of a system of
n particles in classical mechanics.
Bohr also rejected this view of the   function. In his later writings he
often used the term wholenesswhen discussing quantum measurement.
... the essential wholeness of a proper quantum phenomenon nds
indeed logical expression in the circumstance that any attempt at its
well-dened subdivision would require a change in the experimental
arrangement incompatible with the appearance of the phenomenon
itself. ([7], p. 72)
Earlier he had applied the term individuality in a similar way, but more
widely to apply also to atomic processes other than measurement. For example,
he says that the essence of quantum theory
...may be expressed in the so-called quantum postulate, which at-
tributes to any atomic process an essential discontinuity, or rather
individuality, completely foreign to the classical theories and sym-
bolized by Plancks quantum of action. ([5], p. 53)
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As far as I know Bohr neither uses entangleor its derivatives nor considers
analyses like Schrödingers that apply quantum theory to a measurement inter-
action. Indeed his remarks about observation strongly suggest that he would
consider any such application mistaken. Instead his writings repeatedly trace
quantum "wholeness" back to "the quantum postulate" introduced by Planck
prior to the development of matrix and wave mechanics. As far as I can tell,
Bohr did not himself seek to draw metaphysical conclusions from the quantum
theory of entanglement. But Einstein seems to have thought otherwise.
Of the orthodoxquantum theoreticians whose position I know,
Niels Bohrs seems to me to come nearest to doing justice to the
problem. Translated into my own way of putting it, he argues as
follows: If the partial systems A and B form a total system which is
described by its   function  AB , there is no reason why any mu-
tually independent existence (state of reality) should be ascribed to
the partial systems A and B viewed separately, not even if the par-
tial systems are spatially separated from each other at the particular
time under consideration. The assertion that, in this latter case, the
real situation of B could not be (directly) inuenced by any mea-
surement taken on A is, therefore, within the framework of quantum
theory, unfounded and (as the paradox shows) unacceptable. ([15],
pp. 681-682)
This is how Einstein seems to have understood the following crucial passage
in Bohrs reply to the EPR paper, in which he takes Bohrs system to comprise
the total system AB.
Of course there is in a case like that just considered no question of
a mechanical disturbance of the system under investigation during
the last critical stage of the measuring procedure. But even at this
stage there is essentially the question of an inuence on the very
conditions which dene the possible types of predictions regarding
the future behavior of the system. ([6], p. 700)
But notice that Bohr speaks not about states of reality but only of "possible
predictions". Here and elsewhere he is concerned more about the conditions
presupposed by meaningful description of physical systems than about the na-
ture of any reality to which such statements might correspond. If thats right,
Einstein here turns Bohr into metaphysician against his wishes.
By contrast, Einstein acknowledges his own metaphysical commitments
and explains how they inuence his attitude toward quantum theory.
What does not satisfy me in [quantum] theory, from the stand-
point of principle, is its attitude towards that which appears to me to
be the programmatic aim of all physics: the complete description of
any (individual) real situation (as it supposedly exists irrespective
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of any act of observation or substantiation). Whenever the posi-
tivistically inclined modern physicist hears such a formulation his
reaction is that of a pitying smile. He says to himself: "there we
have the naked formulation of a metaphysical prejudice, empty of
content, a prejudice, moreover, the conquest of which constitutes
the major epistemological achievement of physicists within the last
quarter-century. Has any man ever perceived a real physical situa-
tion? How is it possible that a reasonable person could today still
believe that he can refute our essential knowledge and understanding
by drawing up such a bloodless ghost?" Patience! The above laconic
characterisation was not meant to convince anyone; it was merely to
indicate [a] point of view. (op.cit. p. 667)
Einstein took as a key tenet of the "orthodox" quantum theoreticians (among
whom he included Bohr) that the description of a system by means of the
  function is complete. The EPR argument, as well as the modied argument
that Einstein himself repeated after expressing dissatisfaction with the way the
EPR paper turned out7 , was intended to show that this tenet is false. Einsteins
modied argument rst emerged in a letter he wrote to Schrödinger dated June
19, 1935. This argument assumed a principle governing the states of systems
that have interacted only in the past which Howard ([36], p. 180) translates as
follows:
Real State Separability Principle: The real state of the pair AB
consists precisely of the real state of A and the real state of B,
which states have nothing to do with one another.
By accepting this principle Einstein rejected a kind of holism. He argued
that acceptance of such holism is the only way to hold on to the "orthodox"
tenet that the description of a system by means of the   function is com-
plete. That is why he thought orthodox quantum theorists were committed
to a kind of metaphysical holism. But since Bohr denied any descriptive role
to the   function Einstein was wrong to include him in the company of the
"orthodox" theoreticians.8
Whether or not a   function completely describes a system to which
it is assigned, one can formulate a more general principle applicable to state
assignments in any physical theory.
State Separability : The state assigned to a compound physical sys-
tem at any time is supervenient on the states then assigned to its
component subsystems.
There are assignments of quantum states to compound systems that vio-
late this principle, including (5) and (7). Whether this has any metaphysical
implications depends on the nature of quantum states.
7See ([18], chapter 3).
8Einstein was right to consider Dirac, von Neumann and others following them "orthodox"
in his sense because they accepted the descriptive completeness of the theory.
10
In common parlance as well as classical mechanics the term stateis gen-
erally used to connote the condition of something, either at one moment or as
this varies over a period of time: a systems state says how it is what are the
properties and relations of the things that make it up. In this usage, to specify
the state of a system is to describe it. If this is the function of state assignment,
then State Separability is incompatible with holism, understood as follows:
Physical Property Holism: There is some set of physical objects
from a domain D subject only to type P processes, not all of whose
qualitative intrinsic physical properties and relations supervene on
qualitative intrinsic physical properties and relations in the super-
venience basis of their basic physical parts (relative to D and P).
It is perhaps not too much of a stretch to read Einstein as rejecting such
metaphysical holism, while taking the "orthodox" quantum theoreticians to be
committed to it.
Elsewhere Einstein ([14], pp. 323-4) stated a closely related principle
that appealed to spatiotemporal location as a condition of separation.
An essential aspect of [the] arrangement of things in physics is that
they lay claim, at a certain time, to an existence independent of
one another, provided these objects are situated in di¤erent parts
of space. (Transl. Howard [37])
Here are two metaphysical principles suggested by this (cf. my [29]).
Spatial Separability : The qualitative intrinsic physical properties of a
compound system are supervenient on those of its spatially separated
component systems together with the spatial relations among these
component systems.
Spatiotemporal Separability : Any physical process occupying space-
time region R supervenes upon an assignment of qualitative intrinsic
physical properties at spacetime points in R.
To deny either of these two principles is to accept a corresponding variety
of metaphysical nonseparability.
Of all the "founding fathers" it was only Einstein who perceived meta-
physical intimations of entanglement concerning holism and nonseparability.
But he denied that entanglement implied any kind of holism and nonseparabil-
ity and used this denial as a premise in his arguments against a view of quantum
theory he took to have such metaphysical implications. This may not have been
Bohrs view, but Einstein was not wrong to call it "orthodox". Dirac and von
Neumann maintained the descriptive completeness of quantum description and
many others have followed them. This now includes a number of philosophers
who have drawn the kind of metaphysical conclusions that Einstein rejected.
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5 "Orthodox" Prospectors
Quantum entanglement is in the rst instance a mathematical relation between
mathematical objects that may be used to represent the states of systems. To
promote this to a physical relation such mathematical objects must be taken to
represent something physical, in which case these are physical states describing
physical systems. On the view I shall follow Einstein in calling "orthodox",
to assign a quantum state to a system is to describe it, indeed to describe it
completely.
This is a qualied sense of completeness. Assigning state (2) to a
hydrogen atom does not describe the quark constituents of its nuclear proton,
and while (2) includes the magnitudes mp;me; e it does not say that these are
(in order) the mass of the proton, and the mass and charge of the electron. To
assign this state is to treat a hydrogen atom as a non-relativistic system of two
structureless, spinless particles. This idealization is clearly incomplete because
it omits features of real hydrogen atoms.
The "orthodox" view is that this description is nevertheless complete
in the sense that it cannot be completed by specifying the values of all classical
dynamical variables pertaining to an idealized system of this type, or of any
other "hidden" dynamical variables. One way to make this more precise is to
adopt a semantic rule Fine [19] calls the eigenstate-eigenvalue link: this holds
that a dynamical variable of a system has an eigenvalue if and only if the state of
the system is an eigenstate of the corresponding operator with that eigenvalue
(or a mixture of such eigenstates). Dirac [11] and von Neumann [59] arguably
both adopted this rule in their seminal texts, and something like it continues
to be implicit (though unremarked) in many contemporary presentations of
quantum theory.
Applied to state (2) the eigenstate-eigenvalue link implies that the hy-
drogen atom has a precise internal energy ( 13:6 electron volts) and (ignor-
ing mathematical niceties) a precise center of mass momentum P if '(R) /
exp(iP:R=~), but that it has no denite center of mass position; and its elec-
tron has no denite location, speed, kinetic energy or potential energy relative
to its proton. Applied to (5) (or (7)) the eigenstate-eigenvalue link has the
surprising implications that neither atom has a denite spin component in any
direction even though their total spin (as well as its component in any direction)
is zero; and that neither atom is anywhere in particular neither in Leiden nor
in Rio. By contrast, if the eigenstate-eigenvalue link is applied to (4) it has the
expected implications that a lithium atom in Leiden has spin up with respect
to the z-axis while a lithium atom in Rio has spin down.
Suppose one takes the eigenstate-eigenvalue link to specify the real
state of a system. Then the failure of State Separability implies that the Real
State Separability Principle is false, arguably demonstrating Physical Property
Holism: In the state (7) the hydrogen atoms are the basic physical parts of the
pair they compose, whose real state includes a property having zero spin that
does not supervene on qualitative intrinsic physical properties and relations of
those atoms (including their spins and spatial relations).
12
The "orthodox" argument for nonseparability (i.e. the denial of Spatial
Separability and/or Spatiotemporal Separability) is not quite so straightforward.
To use the supposed falsity of the Real State Separability Principle to refute
Spatial Separability one needs an example of spatially separated subsystems.
But in the "orthodox" view, the atoms in a state like (5) or (7) have no denite
spatial location! Nevertheless, if the spatial   functions of the states jLia ; jRib
are su¢ ciently localized9 , (something like) the eigenstate-eigenvalue link will
imply that they are separated by a (fairly) determinate distance. The atoms may
then be claimed to be spatially separated even though the qualitative intrinsic
physical properties (e.g. the spin) of the pair are not supervenient on those of
each individual atom, even together with their spatial relations.
6 Unorthodox Interpretations
Einsteins own argument that the quantum description is incomplete did not
depend on the eigenstate-eigenvalue link. It targeted a version of "orthodoxy"
according to which quantum reality is completely and directly described by
the   function, with no need to infer values of classical dynamical variables.
In rejecting such "orthodoxy", Einstein suggested an unorthodox alternative
according to which
The individual system (before the measurement) has a denite value
...for all variables of the system, and more specically, that value
which is determined by a measurement of this variable. Proceeding
from this conception ...the   function is no exhaustive description
of the real state of the system but an incomplete description. ([15],
p. 83)
By accepting Einsteins alternative one can block any inference from entan-
glement to metaphysical holism or nonseparability. But the "no-go" theorems
of Gleason [25], Bell ([2],[3]) and Kochen and Specker [41] have shown that
Einsteins alternative is unacceptable: the   function or quantum state it rep-
resents is not just the source of a probability distribution over possessed values
of all dynamical variables. A variety of unorthodox interpretations have come
to regard a quantum state as a novel element of physical reality and so reopened
the way to metaphysical conclusions that Einstein sought to block. Ill briey
mention some before showing how entangled quantum states provide us with an
objective resource in explanatory as well as practical applications of quantum
theory even though a quantum state is not an element of physical reality.
9Rigorously, they can never be localized at a point and the eigenstate-eigenvalue link
cannot be applied to either of these states. Physicists commonly assume a vague but stronger
principle inferring spatial location from a "su¤ciently" localized spatial  -function. That
is why I use the phrase "or something like it". It is interesting to note that the entangled
spatial state to which the authors of the EPR argument appealed did not require rigorous
localization of component spatial states. But they did apply the eigenstate-eigenvalue link to
states without regard for mathematical niceties!
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According to what Wallace and Timpson [60] call wave-function realism,
the state vector j i is a way of codifying the properties of the physical state. It
does this for one-particle quantum mechanics by assigning expectation values
to dynamical variables by the usual prescription
expA = h 
A^ i:
But such an expectation value cannot be understood in the usual way as the
mean of a probability distribution for measured values of A, since it represents
a physical property of an individual system. But what is that system, and how
can such a property be understood? The wave function  of "an N particle
system" is dened at points of a conguration space of 3N dimensions, and
 may be thought of as a physical eld, dened not in ordinary 3 space but
in this much higher-dimensional physical space. Both ordinary 3-space and
the N "particles" are not parts of the fundamental ontology, but emerge from
it given the form of the Hamiltonian dened on 3N dimensional space. In
that case expA is a property not of any particle or system of particles, but of
3N dimensional space: properties of systems of particles emerge from or are
grounded in such fundamental properties of 3N dimensional space along with
their bearers. There is no metaphysical holism or nonseparability at the funda-
mental level where the elementary objects are just points of 3N dimensional
space, the   function on which fully species their properties. But metaphysi-
cal holism and nonseparability do emerge at the "manifest" level of particles in
ordinary 3 space.
Wallace and Timpson raise objections against wave-function realism
and advocate what they call spacetime state realism as a superior alternative.
This takes ordinary 4 dimensional (relativistic) spacetime as physically basic
(whether or not it can be reduced to relations between "events"). A density
operator (or other mathematical object) dened on each open region of space-
time denes an expectation value of dynamical variables for that region, now
understood as properties of the region. If A;B are two such regions then the
density operators A, B are the partial traces of AB over the Hilbert spaces
HB ;HA respectively. Since A, B do not determine AB , the properties of
A;B do not determine those of A+B and so we have metaphysical holism and
nonseparability. Indeed, even Weak Separability fails.
Weak Separability : Any physical process occupying spacetime region
R supervenes upon an assignment of qualitative intrinsic physical
properties at points of R and/or in arbitrarily small neighborhoods
of those points.
Bohmian mechanics may be regarded as an unorthodox interpretation
of non-relativistic quantum mechanics or as an alternative theory. Either way,
it treats the wave function as an element of physical reality while denying that
it provides a complete description of that reality a complete description would
give the location and velocity of every particle at every moment. Processes
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involving only particles are therefore (at least weakly) spatially and spatiotem-
porally separable, and the properties of a compound particle system manifest
no metaphysical holism even though the motion of a particle depends on the
instantaneous positions of all the others. But the wave function does vio-
late spatial and spatiotemporal separability in ordinary 3-space, though not
in 3N dimensional conguration space. The wave function does not exhibit
metaphysical holism. From the point of view of ordinary 3 space it has no
parts, while the properties it may be thought to attribute to any region of
3N dimensional conguration space supervene on the values of  at the points
composing that region.
There is no need here to consider the metaphysical implications of entan-
glement in GRW and other non-linear "collapse" theories since these are alter-
natives to quantum theory rather than unorthodox interpretations of it. Instead
I conclude this rapid survey of unorthodox interpretations by noting that on the
interactive interpretation I proposed in [26] quantum mechanical entanglement
would imply both metaphysical holism and nonseparability.10 That interpreta-
tion gave the state vector a descriptive role while denying the completeness of
this description.
But I have now come to reject not only wave function realism but
any view according to which a quantum state is an element of physical real-
ity, whether represented by a wave function, a state vector, a density operator
or any other mathematical object. This does not mean quantum states are un-
real, subjective, or merely convenient ctions. Quantum states are objective:
whether a quantum state assignment is true or false depends on how the world
is, no matter what anyone may think. But to assign a quantum state is not to
describe a physical system but to do something else, as Ill explain in the next
section. A correct understanding of the function of quantum state assignments
will show why entanglement has such limited metaphysical signicance.
7 Quantum States as Objective Prescriptions
Schrödinger [56] entertained the view that a representative (  function) of a
quantum state represents a state of knowledge a catalog of expectations con-
cerning possible future measurement outcomes. This view di¤ers from that sug-
gested by Einstein because the limited knowledge represented by the   function
concerns not the present condition of the system assigned this state, but the out-
come if a measurement of any kind were performed on it. Such a view has been
expressed so often over the years that it has earned the right to be considered
orthodox.11 But it is problematic for at least two reasons: Who are "we", and
10 Indeed this interactive interpretation was what motivated the analysis of holism and
nonseparability in my [27], not some more "orthodox" interpretation.
11Here are two instances among many.
...the state vector is only a shorthand expression of that part of our information
concerning the past of the system which is relevant for predicting (as far as pos-
sible) the future behavior thereof. ...the laws of quantum mechanics only furnish
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what is it for "us" to observe or measure a system?
A satisfactory account of the nature of quantum states will not mention
observers or their activities. How is this possible if a quantum state is a state of
knowledge about measurement outcomes? As Schrödinger put it, "it" is namely
a sum of knowledge; and knowledge, that no one knows, is none. One can solve
this problem and come to understand quantum states by asking not whether
a quantum state is a state of knowledge or a state of the world but by asking
what function is served by assigning a quantum state. It then becomes clear
that the constitutive function of a quantum state assignment is not to describe
(the world or "our" knowledge of it) but to prescribe.
To assign a quantum state is to prescribe a state of belief more specif-
ically, a state represented by an assignment of credences to certain statements
about the values of dynamical variables.12 To accept quantum theory is to allow
ones credences to be guided by this prescription. However it is represented, a
quantum state is objective not because it is an element of physical reality, but
because it is authoritative. To assign a quantum state is to claim it prescribes
the right credences: if this claim is false, then so is that quantum state assign-
ment. Since a statement assigning the correct quantum state to a system is true
no matter what anyone may think, Peirce [51] would count this state as real:
Leifer [44] would count it as ontic rather than epistemic because it would still
exist if all intelligent beings were suddenly wiped out from the universe. But
quantum states are neither physical objects nor physical magnitudes. In Bells
[4] terminology, a quantum state is not a beable.
As physically situated, and so epistemically limited, a user of quantum
theory can assign quantum states on the basis of what that agent is in a position
to know, in order to form reasonable expectations about what that agent is not
in a position to know. The information to which an agent has access depends
on that agents physical situation. A single agent may gain access to additional
information merely with the passage of time, while spatially separated agents
typically have access to di¤erent information just because they are in di¤erent
places. It is not only spatiotemporal location that imposes physical limits on
ones knowledge of what has happened to a system. Acquisition of observational
knowledge depends on the presence of physical channels capable of conveying
that knowledge to the observer, which is why it is so hard to observe dark matter
in distant galaxies.13
probability connections between results of subsequent observations carried out
on a system. ([62], p.166).
...the quantum state of a Qbit or a collection of Qbits is not a property carried
by those Qbits, but a way of concisely summarizing everything we know that
has happened to them, to enable us to make statistical predictions about the
information we might then be able to extract from them. (Mermin [50], p. 109)
12Here I part company with self-styled quantum Bayesians who take an agents quantum
state to describe her personal state of belief. In section 4 of [30] I contrast both their view
and Rovellis relationism with the present view of quantum states as objective but relational.
13 In the "paradox" of Wigners friend it is the absence of such channels that places Wigner
(outside the laboratory) in a di¤erent agent situation from his friend before he joins him in
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We often apply quantum theory not to the actual world but to some sim-
plied or otherwise modied variant of it to a merely possible world. Clearly
the agent applying the model is not located in that merely possible world. But
even such applications are from the perspective of some merely hypothetical
agent in that world the perspective of what I will call an agent-situation.
All applications of quantum theory are from the perspective of a physically-
characterized agent-situation. Applications to merely possible worlds make it
particularly clear that no agent need occupy such an agent-situation. An agent-
situation is characterized, in part, by a space-time region marking the momen-
tary location of a hypothetical agent. It is common to idealize the histories of
observers by timelike curves in a relativistic space-time their world-lines. In
this idealization the space-time location of an agent-situation would be a point
p on such a curve.
Since no physical processes can convey information faster than light, no
agent at p would have observational access to anything outside the past light
cone of p. So the conditions warranting a quantum state assignment relative to
p lie in (or on) the past light cone of p. A quantum state assignment to a system
relative to p will be a function of everything in the past light cone of p (though
much of what happens there will prove irrelevant). But it is important to notice
that quantum state assignments relative to p,q may di¤er: conditions obtaining
in the past light cone of p may warrant a di¤erent assignment than conditions
obtaining in the past light cone of q. Since every quantum state assignment is
relative to an agent-situation it is misleading to speak of a systems being in
a quantum state, as if this expressed a property of that system rather than a
relation to the agent-situation from whose perspective it is assigned.
By accepting that the constitutive function of a quantum state assign-
ment is not descriptive but prescriptive we have seen why a quantum state need
not be a state of anyones knowledge, even though it can serve as a reliable
source of belief for any agent who happened to occupy the agent-situation from
whose perspective it is correctly assigned. But if this has to be understood as
belief about measurement outcomes then we have not yet succeeded in excising
"the observer" from the story. To do so we will need to examine exactly when,
and in what statements, a quantum state prescribes credences.
A few paragraphs back I represented the relevant belief state as a set of
credences in certain statements about the values of dynamical variables. I use
Lewiss [45] term credenceto refer to a minimally rational degree of belief. For
an agents degrees of belief in a set of statements {Ai} to be minimally rational is
for them to satisfy internal coherence conditions su¢ cient to prove that they may
be represented together by real numbers 0  Cr(Ai)  1 that satisfy a version of
the axioms of probability theory (e.g. If A1; A2 are incompatible then Cr(A1 _
A2) = Cr(A1)+Cr(A2)). Ill call a statement of the form The value of dynamical
variable M on physical system s lies in  a canonical magnitude claim and write
it as Ms 2 . A quantum state assignment exercises its constitutive function
when an agent sets credences in canonical magnitude claims equal to their Born
the lab.
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probabilities.
When legitimately applied to the state vector j	(t)i of a system s at
time t, the Born rule yields probabilities for canonical magnitude claims about
the values of dynamical variables A;B; :::on s
Pr([A 2  ]&[B 2 ]&:::) = 
	(t)jPA( ):PB():::j	(t) (Born rule)
An application of the Born rule is legitimate only if the projection operators
PA( ); PB(); ::: (corresponding to magnitude claims A 2  ; B 2 ; ::: respec-
tively) pairwise commute (e.g. [PA( ); PB()] = 0). This condition is satised
trivially for a single magnitude claim A 2  , which suggests that application
of the Born rule prescribes a credence for every magnitude claim A 2   about
s at t. But the "no-go" theorems that ruled out Einsteins unorthodox sugges-
tion show that if quantum states assigned to s are represented by vectors in a
Hilbert space of 3 or more dimensions, then the Born rule cannot prescribe a
set of credences dened over all canonical magnitude claims about s applying
the Born rule to any state vector would leave one with degrees of belief that
failed to be coherent.14
Restrictions on use of the Born rule are needed to ensure its consistent
application to a system, but it is unsatisfactory to restrict its use to measurement
contexts so that quantum theory becomes merely an algorithm for predicting
the outcomes of "measurements" or "observations", whatever these are supposed
to be. Bell ([4], p. 215) was quite right to reject the use of such words in a
formulation of quantum theory with any pretension to physical precision. There
is no such use in the above formulation of the Born rule. Moreover, use of that
rule is not restricted to "measurement" contexts: its application is restricted
only to canonical magnitude claims with well-dened content. Restrictions on
application of the Born rule to magnitude claims about a system s arise naturally
from ss physical circumstances, since which of these claims have well-dened
content depends on its environment. My [31] applies an inferentialist view of
content to a simple model of decoherence to illustrate the dependence of content
on physical environment.
The Born rule may be legitimately applied only when such decoher-
ence has occurred, and then only to those contentful magnitude claims corre-
sponding to projection operators onto subspaces in the relevant pointer basis.
Such decoherence is never perfect, and nor is a "pointer basis" precisely de-
termined and perfectly constant. But the advice provided by the Born rule
concerning only meaningful magnitude claims privileged by pointer bases in the
same narrow neighborhood will be consistent and typically prove reliable: these
magnitude claims will typically turn out to be true with relative frequencies
closely corresponding to their Born rule probabilities. That is why the evidence
14Here is another way to see the problem. Fine [1982] showed that the CHSH [1969] in-
equalities express necessary and su¢ cient conditions for probability distributions of variable
pairs generated by applying the Born rule to a state vector in a Hilbert space of 4 or more
dimensions to equal marginals of a joint probability distribution over all canonical magnitude
claims about it. Gisins theorem shows those inequalities are violated by any entangled state
of such a system.
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warrants acceptance of quantum theory by following its prescription in setting
credences concerning magnitude claims about physical systems, whether or not
these claims may be taken to report outcomes of measurements.
So a quantum state need represent no observers knowledge, and the
Born rule may be consistently stated and applied with no reference to observa-
tion or measurement.
8 Entanglements Explanatory Role
Entanglement is not only a resource to be exploited in technological applications
of quantum information and communication but also, Ill argue, an objective
resource in explanatory applications of quantum theory.
Practical applications of entanglement depend on two features of the corre-
lations successfully predicted by assignment of entangled quantum states. They
are non-classical insofar as they violate Bell inequalities; and they are highly se-
lective. There are, for example, Bell inequalities whose violation by correlations
between variables on A and B is incompatible with their violation between corre-
sponding variables on A and C.15 Calling entanglement a resource and drawing
attention to its potentially important practical applications may suggest that
it at least represents a physical relation between systems, irrespective of that
relations metaphysical relevance. But entanglements practical applications all
ow from novel features of the correlations successfully predicted by the assign-
ment of entangled quantum states, and to reap the benets of an application it
is enough to take these to be predictions of outcomes of measurements whose
performance is increasingly becoming part of routine laboratory practice.
Whatever their practical usefulness, the correlations successfully pre-
dicted by assignment of entangled quantum states have seemed surprising and
puzzling. They cry out for explanation while resisting any explanation of a
familiar kind. Indeed Bell himself argued that
certain particular correlations, realizable according to quantum me-
chanics, are locally inexplicable. They cannot be explained, that is
to say, without action at a distance. ([4], p. 152)
These and similar correlations have now been realized many times16 . Some
have been content to leave the puzzling correlations unexplained. But quantum
theory is generally regarded as our most powerful explanatory theory, enabling
us to understand all kinds of physical phenomena that eluded the grasp of classi-
cal physics. Why cant quantum theory explain the correlations it so successfully
predicts?
Some (including my former [28] self!) have appealed to ideas of non-
separability or holism as the key to their quantum explanation with no action
15Seevinck [58] provides examples in a nice review of work relating the monogamy of entan-
glement to the shareability of non-classical correlations.
16Giustina et al. [23] report a recent advance on seminal previous experiments to which
they refer.
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at a distance. If successful, this might support an inference to metaphysical
nonseparability and/or holism as required by the best explanation of quan-
tum correlations including those violating Bell inequalities. But such appeals
have not been incorporated into a defensible, Lorentz-invariant interpretation
of quantum theory ([10], [48]), and nor is it clear how they can evade the logic
of Bells argument ([35]). No inference to metaphysical conclusions as required
by the best explanation of the puzzling quantum correlations is plausible in the
light of current knowledge. Such an argument would require either successful
development of a novel interpretation of quantum theory or construction of a
new physical theory. In either case it would be necessary to point to a loophole
in Bells argument.
Everettians can respond to Bells argument by denying its assumption
that a measurement always has a unique outcome, maintaining on the contrary
that measurements of quantum "observables" generally have di¤erent outcomes
in di¤erent "branch-worlds". Without this assumption Bells argument does
not go through, whether or not the world is fundamentally separable. So for an
Everettian it is the multiplicity of "branch-worlds" that is key to the quantum
explanation of non-classical correlations with no action at a distance, not the
truth of metaphysical nonseparability or holism.
Maudlin ([47]) argued that space-like (superluminal) inuences must be
present in experiments verifying them: Price ([52]), on the other hand, sug-
gested their results might be explained by retrocausal inuences. One way for
a measurement on one photon in an EPR-Bohm pair to inuence the result
of a spacelike separated measurement on the other photon would be through
"collapsing its quantum state" just the kind of "spooky" action at a distance
Einstein rejected. Though problematic, such nonstandard causal accounts need
appeal to no metaphysical holism or nonseparability.
In fact "single world" quantum theory may be applied to explain EPR-
Bohm correlations with no superluminal or retro- causation, no quantum state
collapse and no metaphysical holism or nonseparability. To prepare the way
for my later remarks on metaphysics Ill give a quick sketch of the explanation
here.17 The relativization of quantum state assignments to agent-situation is
key to this explanation. An entangled state + = 1=
p
2(jHHi+ jV V i) may be
correctly assigned to a photon pair relative to an agent-situation with location
p in the past light cone of either of the space-like separated polarization mea-
surement events: it is warranted by whatever physical conditions (in the past
light cone of p) the experimenters used to prepare that state, such as parametric
down-conversion of laser light by passage through a non-linear crystal.
Because of decoherence at the detectors, the Born rule is legitimately
applied to this state to yield an equal chance of either outcome of any linear
polarization measurement at either detector, but chance cos2  that the two de-
tectors will yield the same outcome for linear polarization measurements with
respect to axes inclined at an angle  to one another. It is important to stress
17For a fuller account see my [34]. Note that both the sketch, section 9.1, and much of
section 10 depend on the view of quantum states presented in section 7 (see also [30]).
20
that these chances are also relative to agent-situation with location p. For
anyone who accepts quantum theory, they give the objectively correct advice
to one located at p about how rmly to believe the corresponding outcome(s)
will be recorded. Thus anyone warranted in assigning state + is able to form
reliable expectations about correlations between outcomes of polarization mea-
surements, as expressed by magnitude claims about the detectors.
Consider instead an agent situation with location q in the future light
cone of recording event 1 but not of recording event 2. Relative to q, the
correct quantum polarization state to assign to the distant photon in the past
light cone of 2 depends on the outcome at 1: suppose it is Va, where linear
polarization at 1 was measured with respect to axis a. Then jVai is the correct
quantum state to assign to the distant photon, relative to agent situation with
location q. This is not because "the" quantum state of the pair has collapsed:
the correct quantum state to assign relative to agent-situation with location p is
still represented by density operator 12 1^ the reduced state of 
+. The correct
state relative to agent situation with location q is jVai because the outcome
at 1 is in the past light cone of q, and so counts as an additional accessible
condition thus warranting the assignment of state jVai relative to q. Relative to
agent situation with location q the chance of outcome Vb at 2 is cos2(a   b),
as follows from the legitimate application of the Born rule to state jVai.
These applications of quantum theory explain the patterns of correla-
tion that are taken to violate CHSH inequalities by showing that they were to
be expected and what they depend on. Both individual outcome events and
the event of their joint occurrence depend causally on the physical conditions
warranting assignment of + since an agent could a¤ect the chances of these
events by modifying those conditions. But there is no causal dependence of
one outcome event on the other, since no-one who accepts quantum theory
can countenance the possibility of an agents modifying either outcome while
keeping xed both detectorssettings and the conditions warranting assignment
of +. Nor do the detector settings have any retrocausal inuence on events
acknowledged by quantum theory.
This explanation of Bells "inexplicable" correlations appeals to no meta-
physical principles such as holism or nonseparability. But the way it treats cau-
sation, chance, modality and explanation itself conveys important lessons for
metaphysics. The last two sections will make these lessons explicit. But rst
I want to clear up two issues raised by talk of grounding. First, in previous
publications (including [33]) I talked that way about the conditions warrant-
ing assignment of a quantum state, so suggesting yet another application of a
concept currently fashionable among metaphysicians. Secondly, this concept
was recently applied (by Ismael and Scha¤er [39]) in connection with the non-
separability that some have thought to lie behind the phenomenon of quantum
entanglement. But neither application is warranted if the function of a quantum
state assignment is not to describe the world but to prescribe belief about it.
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9 No Grounds for Entanglement or Nonsepara-
bility
9.1 Backing is not grounding
I said that a quantum state is objective not because it is an element of physical
reality, but because it is authoritative, and that to assign a quantum state is to
claim it prescribes the right credences, relative to an agent-situation. But what
makes one set of credences right and another wrong? What is it about such
situations that provides the backing for assignment of one quantum state rather
than another? Without an answer to this question, assigning a quantum state
and basing ones expectations on probabilities generated by the Born rule would
be unjustied: following the quantum states prescription would be like basing
ones beliefs on the pronouncements of an oracle with a good track record.
One may be warranted in assigning a particular quantum state while
ignorant of the physical conditions that back it, much as you may be warranted
in following a doctors prescription even though you dont know what makes
the prescription work. But there is an important disanalogy. It is following the
prescription that brings about recovery, whereas using the assigned quantum
state to set ones expectations does not bring about events that fulll them.
One is warranted in basing ones expectations on assignment of a particular
quantum state because whatever physical conditions provide the backing for
that assignment are reliably correlated with the statistics it leads one to expect.
Experimental physicists talk of preparing quantum states. Such talk
may be understood as a way of specifying the physical conditions warranting
the resulting quantum state assignment. For example, to prepare a beam of C60
molecules in a pure (center of mass) quantum state e¤ectively certain to yield
value px in a measurement of x-component of momentum, one can pass the
beam through spinning disks that pass only molecules with the corresponding
velocity: to prepare a collection of rubidium atoms in a state corresponding to
a Bose-Einstein condensate, one inserts a few into a high vacuum, cools them
to within 1 millionth of a degree of absolute zero using carefully designed laser
beams and evaporative cooling and traps them with magnetic elds.18
But there are two reasons why we cant rest content with such a way
of specifying the physical conditions warranting a quantum state assignment.
First, if quantum theory is to be applied outside the laboratory it must be
possible to assign quantum states to systems that no-one has prepared. More
fundamentally, this kind of specication makes free use of the language of clas-
sical physics, but why are we entitled to use such language in specifying the
conditions warranting a particular quantum state assignment?
Fortunately, we can appeal once more to quantum decoherence to quiet
these worries. In section 7 I appealed to decoherence to show how to state
and apply the Born rule with no mention of measurement. But models of
18See http://www.colorado.edu/physics/2000/bec/how_its_made.html for a more com-
plete elementary description.
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decoherence may be much more widely applied to provide reassurance that a
host of magnitude claims have well dened empirical content. Some of these
truly state the conditions warranting assignment of quantum states. What
determine the correct quantum state to assign are the empirically signicant
and true magnitude claims that state its backing conditions. The quantum
state assignment supervenes on these statements. The same thing applies to an
enormous number of statements about the physical world and not only those
stated in the language of classical physics, such as the statement that a Bose-
Einstein condensate was rst prepared in 1995.
A quantum state assignment is objective because it is relative to the
physical, not merely epistemic, situation of an actual or hypothetical agent.
However this physical situation is described, it is true, empirically signicant,
magnitude claims that make the description correct importantly including
claims about the location of such an agent. In the previous section we saw
how Alice and Bob each correctly assigned di¤erent quantum states at the same
time because they were in di¤erent places. An agents physical situation may
inuence what information is physically accessible, so the ideal epistemic state
of an agent is also relative to the agents physical situation. But this introduces
no element of subjectivity into quantum states or Born probabilities.
A true quantum state assignment supervenes on its backing conditions.
It is tempting to conclude that these conditions ground its truth. Unlike quan-
tum state assignments, backing conditions describe the physical world. They
may be expressed by magnitude claims claims about elements of physical re-
ality. Unlike the quantum state, these magnitudes are naturally thought of as
beables even local beables. Backing conditions dont just provide a superve-
nience base for quantum state assignments, they appear to ground them: as
an asymmetric relation, grounding (unlike supervenience) seems to capture the
priority of backing conditions to the quantum state assignments they back.
However, grounding is supposed to be a metaphysical relation, while
closer inspection shows backing conditions to be merely epistemically prior to
the quantum state assignments they back.
Their epistemic priority is clear. While conditions backing assignment of
a quantum state to a system are open to observation (however indirect), the state
they back is not. Suppose one knows nothing about the correct quantum state to
assign to an individual system. No single observation on it can reliably disclose
its state. Repeated observations are no better, since observing a system typically
irreparably disturbs its quantum state. So even if a systems wholly unknown
quantum state could be ascertained by a single observation, this nding could
not be checked in further observations, either by the original observer or by
others. To come to know the quantum state of a system one must have access
to information about it or systems related to it. This must include information
expressible in magnitude claims since this is the only objective information
observation can supply.
But the epistemic priority of backing conditions expressible as magni-
tude claims does not make them metaphysically prior to the quantum state
assignments they warrant. Quantum states not only prescribe credences in sig-
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nicant magnitude claims: through the application of models of decoherence,
they also provide a check on that signicance. By modulating the content of
a magnitude claim, the quantum state in an appropriate model of environmen-
tal decoherence may be thought to control what fact would correspond to the
truth of that claim in that environment. This makes such quantum states ap-
pear semantically or pragmatically prior to the magnitude claims whose content
they control. But of course the quantum states appealed to in a model of de-
coherence must themselves be warranted by other magnitude claims about that
environment: and these states dont so much control as certify the content of
magnitude claims about the original system.
This subtle interplay between magnitude claims and assignment of quan-
tum states is not adequately captured by saying that the former ground the
latter. On the contrary, it weakens the case for taking magnitude claims as pro-
viding a supervenience base of independent physical facts. While a magnitude
claim about a system may still be taken to attribute a value to a local beable,
the fact that the content of that claim depends on the systems environment in-
troduces an element of holism that is not simply attributable to entanglement.
There is a sense in which the physical facts are not wholly independent of one
another, whether or not collectively they ground all other facts.
Moreover, physical property holism is not wholy absent from this pic-
ture. There are circumstances in which environmental decoherence renders sig-
nicant claims about values of magnitudes on compound systems but not on
their component subsystems. For example, in the large molecule interference
experiment of Ju¤man et al. [40] the position of a C60 molecules center of mass
is rendered determinate by interaction with the screen to which it adheres, but
this property of the molecule does not supervene on the positions or any other
properties or relations of its component atoms indeed, claims about just where
those atoms are lack empirical signicance.
9.2 Quantum connection by common causes, not grounds
While not adopting any particular interpretation of quantum theory, Ismael
and Scha¤er [39] argue that it counts in favor of such an interpretation that it
provide for what they call a Common Ground explanation of entanglement
understood via Nonseparability, in ways which lead to Quantum Connection.
Heres what they mean by the italicized expressions.
Nonseparability : Entities a and b are nonseparable if and only if
xing the intrinsic state of a, the intrinsic state of b and the spatial
relations between a and b fails to x the intrinsic state of a+b.
This is almost the denial of what I earlier called Spatial Separability : it
di¤ers only in speaking of two entities rather than any number of systems.
Quantum Connection: In a nonseparable quantum system, non-
identical events ea and eb are modally connected.
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Common Ground : If non-identical events ea and eb are modally
(but not causally) connected then ea and eb are grounding-connected
(/non-distinct), in that either (i) ea grounds eb, or (ii) eb grounds
ea, or (iii) ea and eb are joint results of some common ground c.
I have changed their notation in these last two principles to avoid the sug-
gestion that a,b in the rst principle must be understood as events (rather than
systems or other entities).
Before we get to ground, I have three remarks about entanglement and
Nonseparability. First, in one orthodox view (as elaborated in section 7), entan-
glement is not a physical relation between systems that is in need of explanation.
Rather, by assigning entangled quantum states we can use quantum theory to
explain otherwise inexplicable patterns of correlation. Second, Nonseparabil-
ity is neither a way of understanding entanglement nor an explanation of the
non-classical correlations correctly predicted by assignment of entangled states.
Finally, to assign an entangled quantum state is not to describe the intrinsic
state of a system: neither it nor its subsystems need be describable by empiri-
cally signicant magnitude claims, and even if they are it is not clear that these
specify their intrinsic states.
Quantum Connection ascribes a modal connection to certain events in-
volving a nonseparable quantum system. Passing over the reasons just given for
doubting that there are any nonseparable quantum systems, it is appropriate
to ask what are the events ea and eb and what it is for them to be modally
connected. Ismael and Scha¤er consider a familiar EPR-Bohm pair, say the
hydrogen atoms formed by dissociation of a hydrogen molecule assigned state
(7). They believe the pair of atoms a and b are nonseparable, and consider
events ea and eb in which a,b respectively "measure out at", one with spin up,
the other with spin down with respect to the x -axis. What modal connection
between ea and eb is supposed to follow from ascription of the spin state (6) to
a+b?
Modality is often associated with necessity and possibility, so one might
take Quantum Connection to assert that neither of ea,eb can occur without the
other (even though these events are spatially separated). But this is not plausi-
ble. Suppose that a is measured somewhere and b is due to be measured at some
distant location in Leiden and Rio respectively in my fanciful illustration but
the Rio apparatus doesnt work! Then ea occurs (a "measures out at" x -spin
up, say), but eb does not b never "measures out".19 The "collapse" postulate
that goes along with Einsteins "orthodox" view of the descriptive completeness
of the state vector implies (in conjunction with the eigenstate-eigenvalue link)
that a has x -spin up immediately after "measuring out at" x -spin up, or x -spin
down immediately after "measuring out at" x -spin down, and similarly for b
but with the opposite outcome. If one accepts such an interpretation, one can
take ea,eb to be events that happen to a,b respectively at which each acquires an
intrinsic property it had previously lacked. The modal connection would then
19This would happen most of the time in any realistic experiment, since detector e¢ ciencies
are usually well below 100%.
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be that each acquires an x -spin property if and only if the other acquires the
opposite property one up, the other down. Most importantly, as soon as either
a or b is measured, the other atom acquires the opposite property it doesnt
have to wait until it reaches its detector before doing so.
This appears to restore a necessary connection, but only at the price of
introducing a preferred notion of simultaneity. That is just one of the problems
associated with such an "orthodox" interpretation that takes a state vector to
provide a complete description of the system to which it is assigned. As shown
in the last section, no such problem arises if quantum states are understood
along the lines of section 7. A measurement in Leiden has no immediate e¤ect
in Rio, and neither measurement need result in the atom acquiring the property
it records: in analogous measurements of photon polarization the EPR-Bohm
photons are simply absorbed into the detectors. My main point here is that
whether there is any modally necessary connection requiring explanation here
is highly interpretation dependent, and that there is interpretative pressure in
favor of a view of quantum states that denies that there is such a connection.
Alternatively, one might take a relation of mutual counterfactual depen-
dence between any pair of events ea,eb at which Alice and Bob both actually
"measure out" to constitute a modal connection between these events, even
though either might have occurred without the other given the quantum state
assigned to a + b.20 In evaluating such a counterfactual it is natural to hold
xed that each of a,b "measured out", whether as x -spin up or x -spin down.
Assignment of spin-state (6) then justies one in assigning credence 1 to this
counterfactual. In that sense quantum theory supports the counterfactual, even
though it is implied by no quantum law (neither a dynamical law nor a law of
coexistence like the perfect gas law).
If there were a modal quantum connection, could it be explained by
Common Ground? In the case of spacelike separated measurements on EPR-
Bohm pairs, considerations of spacetime symmetry militate against an explana-
tion of types (i) and (ii), thereby favoring a type (iii) explanation. Ismael and
Scha¤er consider a type (iii) common ground explanation preferable. But what
is c? Its just a+ b:
Singlet (i.e. (6)) is a property of the whole a+ b system. This prop-
erty of the whole system can explain the behavior of its components
(a as well as b) because the whole system grounds the components.
I see two problems with this proposal. The rst problem is that a
variety of interpretations of quantum theory deny that Singlet (i.e. (6)) is a
property of the whole a + b system. Besides the orthodox interpretation de-
scribed and developed in section 7 these include Einsteins unorthodox alterna-
tive, Wallace and Timpsons spacetime state realism, and Bohmian mechanics
(all discussed in section 6). Ismael and Scha¤er may acknowledge this while
continuing to maintain that it counts in favor of an interpretation of quantum
20Correspondence with Ismael conrms this is indeed the kind of modal connection intended
in [39].
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theory that it permit this common ground explanation of Quantum Connection
(and more generally of non-localized correlations that violate Bell inequalities)
without running afoul of Bells theorem (their italics).
The point of a common ground story is to give up locality (under-
stood in terms of a "screening o¤" condition) without positing any
hidden variables, and without positing any causal connection.
But interpretations accepting quantum state assignments as specifying prop-
erties of the systems to which they are assigned (in particular (6) as specifying a
property of the whole a+ b system) must provide a Lorentz invariant account of
how such properties change on measurement (for example, as a,b each "measure
out"). Myrvold [49] provides a Lorentz invariant framework into which a col-
lapse theory may be inserted, but such theories are alternatives to rather than
interpretations of, quantum theory. His earlier paper [48] showed how hard it
is to develop a Lorentz invariant modal interpretation in which a quantum state
species nonseparable properties of systems to which it is assigned. I know,
because I tried [28]!
Ismael and Scha¤er acknowledge in a footnote that they freely move
back and forth between object talk and event talk. This suggests that an al-
ternative way to implement the Common Ground strategy would be to take as
c not a+b but a compound event ea ] eb whose occurrence is constituted by
the joint occurrence of ea and eb. This implementation arguably relieves any
tension with Lorentz invariance but faces other challenges.
That ea and eb are modally connected through their common ground
ea ] eb is not much of an explanation if ea ] eb remains unaccounted for. In
the following section Ill show that, if interpreted along the lines of section 7,
quantum theory can explain not only ea] eb but also ea,eb themselves as e¤ects
of state (6)s backing conditions. This explanation by a common cause that
fails to screen o¤ its localized e¤ects renders superuous any common ground
explanation of the counterfactual connection between ea and eb.
Moreover, in case ea,eb are not space-like but time-like separated ea]eb
is a temporally non-localized event. When ea but not eb has happened, ea
would, on this proposal, be grounded in an event (ea ] eb) that has not yet
wholly occurred. Even those willing to entertain the idea of grounding as a
priority relation may be unwilling to allow such a metaphysical possibility.
10 Quantum Fools Gold
Quantum entanglement has been taken to raise the prospect of some kind of
metaphysical holism or nonseparability. If to assign a quantum state is not
to describe physical reality, but to o¤er objective prescriptions concerning the
signicance and credibility of beliefs about it, then that prospect appears bleak.
But that is not to say entanglement is without philosophical interest.
On the contrary, one can learn a lot about chance, causation and ex-
planation by reecting on the role of entanglement in explaining non-classical
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correlations like those Bell took to be inexplicable without action at a distance.
Since these concepts have provided the focus of much metaphysical discussion
(not only among professional philosophers) entanglement does have implications
for metaphysics. But I take these to be negative implications for the practice of
metaphysics rather than positive metaphysical conclusions. The explanation of
non-local correlations requires no metaphysical holism. But it should prompt
philosophers to question whether a philosophical investigation of chance, causa-
tion and explanation is best pursued by the methods of contemporary analytic
metaphysics. Prospectors for gold can be disappointed to nd only fools gold.
But small amounts of precious metals can be extracted from iron pyrite deposits.
That metaphor prompted the title of this section.
In section 8 I claimed that quantum theory may be applied to explain
Bells particular correlations by showing that they were to be expected and
what they depend on. To amplify this brief summary Ill begin by considering
exactly what is to be explained. Here it is important to distinguish between
statistical correlations exhibited in actual experiments (or elsewhere in nature)
and the probabilistic phenomenon these may be taken to manifest. What is a
probabilistic phenomenon?
Experimenters often plot a smooth curve through data points to indicate
the relationship between values of the plotted magnitudes, such as the extension
of a spring when di¤erent small weights are suspended from it. According to
Hookes law this is a linear relationship. Data points from actual experiments
manifest Hookes law: they do not constitute it. It is a fact about the data
from many properly conducted experiments that they may be well modeled by
Hookes law. When we give an explanation of Hookes law we explain this fact,
not actual data obtained in experiments on springs. This example is typical:
when a phenomenon is explained, the explanandum is not the actual data that
manifest it, but the fact that those data may be well modeled by a generalisation
that abstracts from the complex details of the processes that produce data in
particular circumstances, and idealizes and extrapolates from such data. Most
interesting scientic explanations are not of particular events but of such general
phenomena.
If the association between data specifying values of magnitudes is merely
statistical, one cannot plot a single smooth curve to indicate any xed relation-
ship between them. Instead one can often give a probabilistic model. Such data
are often the result of multiple complex processes whose details we can neither
predict nor control. Casinos depend both on the unpredictability of the out-
come of any given spin and on a probabilistic model of the outcome statistics
of large numbers of spins that assigns equal probability to the ball landing in
each sector of the wheel. It is because the outcomes of spins of a roulette wheel
and tosses of a biased coin are best modeled probabilistically that I call them
probabilistic phenomena.
In explaining a probabilistic phenomenon one does not give a causal ex-
planation of individual events whose statistical distribution one takes to manifest
it. Instead, one shows how the probabilities dening the phenomenon are them-
selves just particular instances of a more general class of probabilities exhibited
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by a wide range of other phenomena. All phenomena in this class are thereby
unied by the probabilistic theory used to model them. Viewed as a probabilis-
tic phenomenon, Bells particular correlations are explained by showing how
they may be modeled by quantum theorys Born probabilities. To exhibit some
probabilities as an instance of a wider class of probabilities is not to explain
them causally: probabilities are not events, and a probabilistic phenomenon is
not a compilation of actual events. Indeed, when Bell was writing (in 1981) no
actual events were known to manifest the particular correlations of atom pairs
he took to defy explanation without action at a distance.
Woodward ([63], p. 219) has remarked on a common feature of causal and
non-causal explanations:
[. . .] the common element in many forms of explanation, both
causal and non-causal, is that they must answer what-if-things-had-
been-di¤erent questions [w -questions].
The quantum explanation of Bells correlations as a probabilistic phenom-
enon can answer many w -questions, such as what probabilistic phenomenon
would be manifested by a di¤erent entangled state, or by di¤erent particles, or
if the same state had been prepared by an entanglement-swapping operation, or
if a particle had passsed through a magnetic eld prior to detection. By doing
so it unies all the other phenomena: it shows what they have in common and
thereby helps us better to understand them all. These counterfactual answers
to w -questions also show what Bells correlations depend on.
But causal considerations are not irrelevant here, since there are also
dependency relations among events in any instance that may contribute to a
manifestation of the phenomenon. So showing that a probabilistic phenomenon
is a case of a more general probabilistic phenomenon provides a satisfactory
explanation only if these events exhibit the right kind of dependency relations.
Indeed, it is just such relations that Bell maintains must exhibit problematic
causal dependencies in any explanation of the correlations. So it is important
to show why the quantum explanation sketched in section 8 involves no instan-
taneous action at a distance. To see that it does not we need to understand how
Born probabilities are applied to yield chances, and how chances are related to
causal dependence.
By chance I mean the denite, single-case probability of an individual
event such as rain tomorrow in Tucson. As in this example, its chance depends
on when the event occurs afterwards, it is always 0 or 1: and it may vary up
until that time as history unfolds. Chance is important because of its conceptual
connections to belief and action. The chance of e provides an agents best guide
to how strongly to believe that e occurs, when not in a position to be certain
that it does.21 And the comparison between es chances according as (s)he
does or does not do D are critical in the agents decision about whether to do
D. These connections explain why the chance of an event defaults to 0 or 1
21 I use the tenseless presentrather than the more idiomatic future tense here for reasons
that will soon become clear.
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when the agent is in a position to be certain about it typically, after it does
or doesnt occur.
Probabilistic theories may be useful guides to the chances of events,
but what they directly yield are not chances but general probabilities of the
form PrC(E) for an event of type E relative to reference class C. To apply
such a general probability to yield the chance of e, you need to specify the
type E of e and also the reference class C. A probabilistic theory may o¤er
alternative specications when applied to determine the chance of e, in which
case it becomes necessary to choose the appropriate specications. Actuarial
tables may be helpful when estimating the chance that you will live to be 100,
but you di¤er in all kinds of ways from every individual whose death gures
in those tables. What you want is the most complete available specication
of your situation: this may include much irrelevant information, but its not
necessary to exclude this since it wont a¤ect the chance anyway. In Minkowski
space-time, the conceptual connection between chance (Ch) and the degree of
belief (Cr) it prescribes is captured in this version of David Lewiss Principal
Principle that implicitly denes chance:22
The chance of e at p, conditional on any information Ip about the
contents of ps past light cone satises: Crp(e=Ip) =df Chp(e).
Suppose that in the scenario of section 8 Alice repeatedly measures the
polarization of a photon a in a pair and Bob measures the polarization of paired
photon b with respect to the same axis (a = b), where these measurements are
always spacelike separated but Alices occurs slightly later in their laboratory
frame. Now consider an agent who accepts quantum theory and wishes to
determine the chance of the event eA that the next photon detected by Alice
registers as of polarization type V (ertical). Assuming that the state + was
prepared and decisions to measure polarization with respect to this axis made
long before, the agent is also in a position to be certain what these were. The
agent is then in a position to use the Born rule to determine the chance of eA.
But that chance must be relativized not just to a time, but (relativistically) to
a space-time point.
Let p be a point just in the past light cone of Alices measurement in
region 1 and p0 be just in the past light cone of Bobs measurement in region
2, while q is just in region 2s future light cone, simultaneous in the laboratory
frame with p. Suppose Bobs photon registers as vertically polarized and we
wish to apply the Born rule to nd the chance that Alices will also. Consider
an event eA of the next photon detected in 1s future light cone registering as
vertically polarized: i.e. that eA is of type V . The specication of the reference
class at least includes the state and the axes of polarization measurement: but
for Chq(eA) we further need to specify a type V outcome in region 2. Hence
22See Ismael [38]. I have slightly altered her notation to avoid conict with my own. Here
e ambiguously denotes both an event and the proposition that it occurs. Cr stands for
credence: an agents degree of belief in a proposition, represented on a scale from 0 to 1 and
required to conform to the standard axioms of probability.
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Chp(eA) = Pr+(VA) =
1
2
;
Chq(eA) = Pr+(VAjVB)  Pr+(VA; VB)
Pr+(VB)
=
1
2
1
2
= 1:
Any agent who accepts quantum theory and is (momentarily) located
at space-time point x should match credence in eA to Chx(eA) because it is
precisely the role of chance to reect the epistemic bearing of all information
accessible at x on facts not so accessible, and to accept quantum theory is
to treat it as an expert when assessing the chances. This is so whether or
not an agent is actually located at x fortunately, since it is obviously a gross
idealization to locate the epistemic deliberations of a physically situated agent
at a space-time point! A hypothetical agent located at q in the forward light
cone of region 2 (but not 1) has access to the additional information that the
outcome in 2 is of type V : so the reference class used to infer the chance of eA
at q from the Born rule should include that information. That is why Chq(eA)
is determined by the conditional Born probability Pr+(VAjVB) but Chp(eA)
is determined by the unconditional Born probability Pr+(VA).
In this case application of the Born rule yields the chances Chp(eA),
Chp0(eB) =
1
2 ; but Chq(eA) = 1. Bell ([2004, pp. 240-41]) says
Each of the counters considered separately has on each repetition of
the experiment a 50% chance of saying yes.
After noting that quantum theory here requires a perfect correlation between
the outcomes in 1;2, he continues
So specication of the result on one side permits a 100% condent
prediction of the previously totally uncertain result on the other side.
But only for a hypothetical agent whose world-line has entered the future
light cone of 2 near q is it true that specication of the result in 2 permits a
100% condent prediction of the previously totally uncertain result on the other
side. A hypothetical agent at p is not in a position to make a 100% condent
prediction. For such an agent the result in 1 remains totally uncertain: what
happens in 2 makes no di¤erence to what (s)he should believe, since region 2 is
outside the past light cone of p. That is why it is Chp(eA), not Chq(eA), that
says what is certain at p. Newtonian absolute time fostered the illusion of the
occurrence of future events becoming certain everywhere at the same time
when they occur if not sooner. Relativity requires certainty, like chance, to be
relativized to space-time points idealized locations of hypothetical knowers.
In one traditional view the past (unlike the future) is xed, settled or
metaphysically certain. Apart from its other problems, this view is hard to
formulate in a relativistic spacetime. If one identies the past with everything
earlier than now (as dened by the time of some global frame) then what past
events are xed depends on an arbitrary choice of that frame. If one identies
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the past with the past light cone, then xity is relative to the spacetime point
whose past light cone it is. Certainty, unlike xity, represents an epistemic
ideal for a physically situated knower: so it has the exibility required to with-
stand relativization to potential spacetime locations of a hypothetical, idealized
knower.
Bell seemed to view chances as localized physical magnitudes. But
quantum theory teaches us that chances are not localized physical propensities
whose actualization may produce an e¤ect. Maudlin says what he means by
calling probabilities objective:
...there could be probabilities that arise from fundamental physics,
probabilities that attach to actual or possible events in virtue solely
of their physical description and independent of the existence of
cognizers. These are what I mean by objective probabilities. ([1], p.
294)
Although quantum chances do attach to actual or possible events, they are
not objective in this sense. As we saw, the chance of outcome eA does not
attach to it in virtue solely of its physical description: the chances of eA at-
tach also in virtue of its space-time relations to di¤erent space-time locations.
Each such location o¤ers the epistemic perspective of a situated agent, even in
a world with no such agents. The existence of these chances is independent of
the existence of cognizers. But it is only because we are not merely cogniz-
ers but physically situated agents that we have needed to develop a concept
of chance tailored to our needs as informationally deprived agents. Quantum
chance admirably meets those needs: an omniscient God could describe and un-
derstand the physical world without it. While they are neither physical entities
nor physical magnitudes, quantum chances are objective in a di¤erent sense.
They supply an objective prescription for the ideal credences of a hypotheti-
cal agent in any space-time location. Anyone who accepts quantum theory is
committed to following that prescription.
Chq(eA) depends counterfactually on the polarization measurement in
2 and also on its outcome: had either the outcome or the measurement axis been
di¤erent, Chq(eA) would have been di¤erent. Dont such counterfactual di¤er-
ences in Chq(eA) amount to causal dependence between space-like separated
events, constituting instantaneous action at a distance? No, for two reasons.
While Chq(eA) would be di¤erent in each of these counterfactual sce-
narios, in none of them would Chp(eA) di¤er from 12 , so the "local" chance of
eA is insensitive to all such counterfactual variations in what happens in 2. If
one wishes to infer causal from counterfactual dependence of thechance of a
result in 1 on what happens in 2, then only one of two relevant candidates for
thechance displays such counterfactual dependence. For those who think of
chance as itself a kind of indeterministic cause a localized physical propensity
whose actualization may produce an e¤ect Chp(eA) seems better qualied for
the title of thechance of eA than Chq(eA).23
23Friederich makes a similar point in [20].
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The role of chance in decision provides a more important reason. Just
as the chance of e tells you everything you need to know to gure out how
strongly to believe e, the causal dependence of e on d tells you everything you
need to know about e and d when deciding whether to do d (assuming you are
not indi¤erent about e). As Huw Price [54] put it, causal dependence should
be regarded as an analyst-expert about the conditional credences required by
an evidential decision maker.
Consider the situation of a hypothetical agent Bob at p0 deciding whether
to act by a¤ecting what happens in 2 to try to get outcome eA in 1. Bob can
choose not to measure anything, he can choose to measure polarization with
respect to any axis, or he can turn on some local interaction. No-signalling
theorems, going back to Eberhard [13], Bell ([4], pp. 237-8) show why none of
these actions would alter Bobs estimated value of Chq(eA).24
But what if Bob had simply arranged for the measurement in 2 to
have had the opposite outcome eB (an event of type H(orizontal) rather than
V (ertical))? Then Chq(eA) would have been 0 instead of 1. No-one who accepts
quantum theory can countenance this counterfactual scenario. The Born rule
implies that Pr+(HB) =
1
2 , and anyone who accepts quantum theory accepts
the implication that Chp0(eB) = 12 . So anyone who accepts quantum theory
will have credence Crp0(eB=Ip0) = 12 no matter what he takes to happen in the
backward light cone of p0 (as specied by Ip0).25 If he accepts quantum theory,
Bob will conclude that there is nothing it makes sense to contemplate doing to
alter his estimate of Chp0(eB), and so there is no conceivable counterfactual
scenario in which one in Bobs position arranges for the measurement in 2 to
have had the di¤erent outcome eB . In general, there is causal dependence
between events in 1 and 2 only if it makes sense to speak of an intervention in
one of these regions that would a¤ect a hypothetical agents estimated chance of
what happens in the other. Anyone who accepts quantum theory should deny
that makes sense.
By applying quantum theory we can show not only that Bells partic-
ular correlations were to be expected, but also what they depend on. They
depend counterfactually but not causally on the quantum state +, and they
also depend counterfactually on that states backing conditions, as described
by true magnitude claims. The status of the quantum state disqualies it from
participation in causal relations, but true magnitude claims may be taken to
describe beables recognized by quantum theory. To decide which conditions
backing any of the states involved in their explanation describe causes of Bells
24Since he cannot predict the actual value of Chq(eA) following his hypothetical polarization
measurement, he would have to decide on his best estimate of Chq(eA) in accordance with
Ismaels [38] Ignorance Principle:
Where youre not sure about the chances, form a mixture of the chances as-
signed by di¤erent theories of chance with weights determined by your relative
condence in those theories.
25A unitary evolution + ) + corresponding to a local interaction there would still yield
Pr+ (HB) =
1
2
.
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particular correlations or the events they correlate we need further to consider
the connection between causation and chance.
The intuition that, other things being equal, a cause raises (or at least
alters) the chance of its e¤ect is best cashed out in terms of an interventionist
counterfactual: roughly, c is a cause of e just in case c; e are distinct actual
events and there is some conceivable intervention on c whose occurrence would
have altered the chance of e. Such an intervention need not be the act of an
agent: it could involve any modication in c of the right kind. Woodward ([63],
p. 98) is one inuential attempt to say what kind of external inuence this
would involve.26
I used the idea of intervention to argue against any causal dependence
between events in 1 and 2: anyone who accepts quantum theory accepts that it
makes no sense to speak of an intervention on one of these regions that would
a¤ect a hypothetical agents estimated chance of what happens in the other.
So even though the outcome eB in 2 backs the assignment of state jVBi to
Alices photon at q, the outcome in 1 does not depend causally on eB : for
similar reasons, neither does the outcome in 2 causally depend on that in 1.
The same idea can now be used to show that both these outcomes do depend
causally on whatever event o in the overlap of the backward light cones of 1 and
2 warranted assignment of state + an event truly described by magnitude
claims that backed this quantum state.
To keep things simple, assume that the events at which the measure-
ment axes are set on a particular occasion occur in the overlap of the backward
light cones of 1 and 2. Let r be a point outside the future light cones of eA; eB
but within the future light cone of the event o. Let eA ] eB be the event of the
joint occurrence of eA; eB . This is an event of a type to which the Born rule is
applicable: the application yields its chance Chr(eA]eB) = Pr+(VA; VB) = 12 .
Moreover Chr(eA) = Pr +(VA) =
1
2 = Pr +(VB) = Chr(eB). The event o af-
fects all these chances: had a di¤erent event o0 occurred backing the assignment
of a di¤erent state (e.g. jHAijVBi), or no event backing any state assignment,
then any or all of these chances could have been di¤erent. Since it makes sense
to speak of an agent altering the chance of event o at s in its past light cone,
we have
Chr(eA ] eB jdo  o) 6= Chr(eA ] eB)
Chr(eAjdo  o) 6= Chr(eA)
Chr(eB jdo  o) 6= Chr(eB)
where do  o means o is the result of an intervention without which o would not
have occurred. It follows that eA; eB ; eA ] eB are each causally dependent on o:
o is a common cause of eA; eB even though the probabilities of events of these
26Einsteins formulation of a principle of local action also appeals to intervention:
The following idea characterizes the relative independence of objects far apart
in space (A and B): external inuence on A has no immediate ("unmittelbar")
inuence on B; this is known as the principle of local action([14], pp. 321-2)
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types do not factorize. Similar reasoning applies to each registered photon
pair on any occasion for any polarization measurement axes. So the second
requirement on explanation is met: the separate recording events, as well as the
event of their joint occurrence, depend causally on the event o that serves to
back assignment of state + to the photon pairs involved in this scenario.
By rejecting any possibility of an intervention expressed by do   eB
or do  eB , anyone accepting quantum theory should deny that Chp(q)(eAjdo 
eB) 6= Chp(q)(eAjdo eB) is true or even meaningful. Nevertheless Chq(eAjeB) 6=
Chq(eAjeB): in this sense eA depends counterfactually but not causally on eB .
11 Conclusion
Whether quantum entanglement has metaphysical implications sensitively de-
pends on the nature of the quantum state. Schrödinger, who introduced the
term, took the implications to be epistemological rather than metaphysical.
Einstein used the denial of metaphysical holism and nonseparability in arguing
against a view of the quantum state with these implications: But his suggested
alternative proved untenable. If viewed as completely describing reality at a
fundamental level, entanglement of the quantum state of particles would entail
metaphysical nonseparability with respect to ordinary 3 dimensional space,
though not with respect to a conguration space of enormous dimension pro-
vided this could be taken to be the fundamental space of the world. But en-
tangled quantum states of physically real spacetime regions would imply meta-
physical nonseparability in an Everettian view, though this would not be readily
apparent within each branch of the multiverse.
Many have followed Schrödingers characterization of a quantum state
as representing not the world but our knowledge of it complete in the sense that
there is nothing more to be known that would enable better predictions than
those supplied by Born probabilities. When improved in the light of legitimate
objections this leads naturally to a view of quantum states as o¤ering objective
prescriptions to (actual or merely hypothetical) physically situated agents, so
quantum states are relational but not subjective, and real but not beables. In
section 7 I sketched a view of this kind: elsewhere I have called it pragmatist.27
A pragmatist seeks to resolve philosophical puzzles that arise when we
talk or think about something whose nature is unclear not by asking what in the
world it represents but by asking for the function of the associated concept for
what purposes would folk like us have developed a concept like that in a world
like this? There is no presumption that the answer to that question is "To
represent reality", even if the concept plays a central role in the formulation or
application of a fundamental physical theory.
The view of the quantum state sketched in section 7 provides a rst
illustration of this pragmatist strategy. Viewing quantum states as o¤ering pre-
scriptions and not describing the physical world or our knowledge of it opens
27For further details see my ([30], [31], [32], [33]).
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the way to resolution of long-standing conceptual problems of quantum the-
ory, including the measurement problem as well as the problem of non-locality
discussed here. Viewed this way a quantum state is real its prescriptions are
objectively (not just intersubjectively) true or false but it is not an element of
physical (or mental) reality.
One can say that a quantum state assignment depends for its truth on
backing conditions whose function is to describe the physical world. A pragma-
tist regards questions of representation as of minor importance.28 But if pressed
to say what a true quantum state assignment represents it would be better to
say it represents the probabilistic relations between its backing conditions and
possible states of the world described by the signicant magnitude claims which
gure in the Born probabilities that result from its application.
While a metaphysician looks to quantum theory to learn what it says
chance is at a fundamental level, a pragmatist asks instead how the concept of
chance functions in quantum theory as a way of learning why we should have
deployed a concept with those features in that context. While a metaphysician
asks whether quantum theory locates objective chance as a feature of physical
reality at the deepest level, a pragmatist understands the objectivity of chance
in quantum theory to derive from its status as a norm to be followed by rational
agents whose physical situation renders them informationally deprived.
From this perspective the use of chance in quantum theory makes no
radical break with other uses of probability in science as well as daily life. The
role of probability was always to present an informationally limited agent with
a concise recommendation as to how to set credences concerning matters about
which (s)he was not in a position to be certain. What is distinctive about
quantum chance is that this recommendation issues directly from application of
a fundamental physical theory in situations where fundamental physical theory
itself places strict limits on accessible information.
Amateur metaphysicians sometimes express the idea that quantum the-
ory has brought about the downfall of causality, by which they may mean refu-
tation of the view that everything that happens does so by causal necessity
the chain of cause-and-e¤ect works to produce outcomes that are inevitable.
The professional metaphysician David Lewis was contemptuous of this idea and
(along with many other philosophers) o¤ered an account of probabilistic causa-
tion.
Those who know of the strong scientic case for saying that our
world is an indeterministic one, and that most events therein are
to some extent matters of chance, never seriously renounce the com-
monsensical view that there is plenty of causation in the world. ([46],
p. 217)
On some interpretations (Bohman, Everettian), quantum theory is deter-
ministic: on others (Einsteins "orthodox" view, physical "collapse" theories)
28As does Huw Price [53] who advocates subject naturalism as an alternative rather than a
contribution to metaphysics as currently practised.
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it is indeterministic. When the quantum state is understood along the lines
of section 7 neither characterization seems appropriate. When relativized to
spacetime point p the chance of an event at a time (in some frame) may be 1
while it may be 12 relativized to another spacetime point q. It is inappropriate
to call such an event inevitable and equally inappropriate to say it is a matter of
chance. Better to say it is certain relative to p while maximally uncertain with
respect to q. Acceptance of this view undercuts the idea that history is produced
as a result of the operation of causes, either deterministic or probabilistic.
For a pragmatist, causation is best understood along very similar lines,
and not as a physical relation whose nature is to be sought by examining our
most fundamental theories. The main reason we have our concept of causal
dependence is that we require advice on how to set our credence concerning the
possible outcomes of actions we might be contemplating. So to view a relation
between events a; b of types A;B from a causal perspective is to evaluate the
probability that an event of type B would accompany an event of type A in the
hypothetical circumstance that an agent brings about the latter event. One can
adopt this perspective while maintaining inability to occupy it or bring about
such an event, and even accepting that it would be physically impossible for an
agent of any kind to bring about an event of type A in those circumstances.
It is this generalized agential perspective that lies behind the application of
the notion of an intervention to isolate the kind of counterfactual dependence
relation between events that warrants a claim of causal dependence.
By adopting this pragmatist approach to causal dependence one can
come to see both why the use of quantum theory to explain Bells particular
correlations involves no instantaneous action at a distance and why it is appro-
priate to say that events truly described by backing conditions of an entangled
quantum state cause the spacelike separated events they explain. In this way
one can come to understand those events as e¤ects of a common cause even
though their probabilities do not factorize.
A pragmatist can also say why we nd this story satisfying as an ex-
planation while still leaving us frustrated about its incompleteness. It has often
been remarked that providing a scientic explanation of a puzzling phenomenon
can be a uniquely pleasurable experience. But we dont give scientic expla-
nations just for fun: scientic explanations serve two important functions, one
epistemic the other practical. By tting a phenomenon into a wider pattern of
similar phenomena that can all be subsumed under theories by modeling them
all in very similar ways one can achieve a dramatic economy of thought, just
as locating cities and countries on a map enormously helps one to conceptual-
ize their spatial relations. For cognitively limited creatures like us this is an
important epistemic function of unifying explanations in science.
Explanations also have a practical function which can be brought out
by focusing on their causal aspect. We owe our concept of causation to our
limited epistemic and practical abilities. We can nd out much about our past
by memory, observation and instrumental detection. We can then use scientic
theories to attain some warranted beliefs about the future, and with the ability
to control through our own actions we can attain more. But, lacking perfect
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control, to exercise this ability e¤ectively we need just the kind of information
that is available from the causal perspective information about the compara-
tive likelihoods of future eventualities conditional on present decisions between
alternative actions. That is why we nd it overwhelmingly natural to view the
world from a causal perspective and why we seek causal explanations whether
or not they turn out to amplify our ability to control our future.
Section 8s explanation of puzzling correlations successfully predicted
by assignment of an entangled quantum state serves both these epistemic and
practical functions. But, because it does not mention any continuous process
mediating between that states backing conditions and the correlated explananda
events, it apparently restricts the application of the causal perspective to the
spacetime regions to which these pertain, leaving us with nothing to say about
intermediate regions. The restriction is not complete: we can model a situation
in which something is inserted in the space between source and detector (such
as a half-wave plate that is said to rotate the plane of a photons polarization).
But the explanation does not scratch the itch that results from the inability to
describe what is happening there, with or without an intervening object or eld.
Viewing a quantum state as a physical object or property may appear to relieve
this itch, but the adverse consequences of such a view show the relief is at best
temporary.
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